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Abstract
Background: Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) are the leading global source of added sugar intake and their
consumption is associated with negative health outcomes, such as diabetes, cancers, cardiovascular diseases, and
overall mortality. Despite consensus within the public health community about the need to reduce sugar intake,
the non-alcoholic beverage industry engages in efforts to publicly undermine the evidence base surrounding the
harmful effects of SSBs. There has been limited investigation of how SSB industry actors engage in public debates
to challenge public health research and policy on SSBs. To address this gap, we thematically analyze the public
comments and press releases of the British Soft Drinks Association (BSDA) since May 2014.
Results: A total of 175 news articles and 7 press releases were identified where the BSDA commented upon new
SSB research in public settings. In these comments, four strategies were observed to undermine new research. First,
the BSDA challenged study rigour and research design (n = 150). They challenged the policy implications of
research by stating observational studies do not demonstrate causation, refuted data sources, questioned
researcher motivations, and claimed research design did not account for confounding factors. Second, the BSDA
positioned themselves as an altruistic public health partner (n = 52) intent on improving population-level nutrition
citing their voluntary industry commitments. Third, the BSDA promoted concepts of safety that align with industry
interests (n = 47). Lastly, the BSDA argued that the lifestyle of individual consumers should be the focus of public
health interventions rather than the industry (n = 61).
Conclusion: The findings illustrate the BSDA reliance on arguments of causation to discredit research and avoid
policy interventions. Given the attention by the BSDA regarding the purported lack of evidence of causation
between SSBs and non-communicable diseases, it is imperative that members of the public health community try
to educate policy makers about (a) the complex nature of causation; (b) that evidence in favour of public health
interventions cannot, and do not, solely rely on causation studies; and (c) that public health must sometimes abide
by the precautionary principle in instituting interventions.
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Introduction
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) were responsible
for 41 million deaths in 2017 or 71% of all deaths
globally [1]. There is now clear evidence that a sig-
nificant contributor to the risk of developing NCDs is
an excess intake of added sugars [2]. According to
the American Heart Association, excess added or free
sugar intake amounts to 37.5 g/9 teaspoons for adult
males and 25 g/6 teaspoons for adult females daily
[3]. The leading source of added sugar intake comes
from sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) [4, 5]. In-
creased consumption of SSBs is thus associated with
weight gain, obesity, and an overall increase in risk of
NCDs such as diabetes and various forms of cancer
[6–11]. While these trends were previously observed
in high-income countries primarily, alarming increases
in NCDs associated with excess sugar intake is now
occurring in low- and middle-income countries [12].
In response, the World Health Organization (WHO)
has called for action to reduce the consumption of
SSBs [13]. Among the varied measures being adopted,
governments worldwide have introduced increased
taxation of SSBs to raise their price and discourage
consumption [14].
Contrary to broad consensus within the public health
community about the need to reduce excess sugar con-
sumption, it is now well-documented that the food in-
dustry has engaged in longstanding efforts to undermine
and challenge the existing evidence base [15–19]. From
the 1960s onwards, the sugar industry recruited scien-
tists to downplay the role of sugar as a contributing fac-
tor to heart disease, shifting public concerns to the need
to reduce consumption of fats [15, 20, 21]. The Inter-
national Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), founded in 1978
by a former Coca-Cola executive and financed by com-
panies such as Coca-Cola, Nestlé, McDonald’s and Pep-
siCo, describes itself as a “non-profit, worldwide
organization whose mission is to provide science that
improves human health and well-being and safeguards
the environment.” [22] Its activities have included fund-
ing research, and its dissemination worldwide, attribut-
ing NCDs to consumer choices, ageing, and lack of
physical activity rather than the production and con-
sumption of specific food products [23]. In China, for
example, ILSI position statements and recommendations
were incorporated into government guidelines to combat
the country’s rapid rise in obesity rates since the early
2000s [24, 25]. Manufacturers of SSBs, the leading
source of added sugar intake, have advanced similar
themes. For example, in 2015 the Coca Cola Company’s
“science-based” approach to the obesity epidemic, pro-
moted through its non-profit Global Energy Balance
Network, sought to shift public attention from reduced
sugar consumption to physical activity [19]. The
beverage industry as a whole has also disputed evidence
demonstrating the effectiveness of public health inter-
ventions targeted at SSBs, including fiscal measures such
as increased taxation. In a 2016 review of sixty studies
investigating the link between SSBs and health outcomes
such as obesity or diabetes, it was found that the 26
studies funded by industry found no association [26].
Despite suggestions of bias in industry-funded studies,
the American Beverage Association argued that “re-
search we fund adheres to the highest standards of in-
tegrity for scientific inquiry” [27].
Amid growing evidence of industry interference in the
scientific process underpinning public health research
and policy concerning excess sugar intake, and health
and nutrition more broadly [28, 29], the public health
community has sought to counter these activities by re-
butting industry claims in the public domain. This has
been in response to the industry’s strategic use of
public-facing messaging – defined as communicative ac-
tions promoting a view or stance – in the form of blogs,
social media and political advertising campaigns, to chal-
lenge new research perceived as threatening to industry
interests [30]. The limited study to date of the strategic
use of public-facing messaging, and how it influences
policy-debates on SSB regulation, has focused on media
coverage of messaging by public health versus industry
advocates, notably in the United States (US) and United
Kingdom (UK), concerning the introduction of SSB tax-
ation [31–33]. These studies contribute important un-
derstanding of “the complexity of the network of
stakeholders involved in the public debate on food pol-
icies,” and their positioning supporting or opposing
regulation [34]. However, there is limited attention so
far to how SSB industry actors use evidence to insert
themselves into public policy debates.
We begin to address this knowledge gap by presenting
a case study of public-facing messaging by the British
Soft Drinks Association (BSDA) to challenge public
health research and evidence on SSBs. The BSDA is the
“collective voice of the UK soft drinks industry” and, as
the leading trade association for non-alcoholic beverage
companies, regularly comments on new research and the
industry’s position on SSB-related regulation [35]. We
have selected the BSDA and UK context as a critical case
study because the government’s introduction of the Soft
Drinks Industry Levy in 2018, equivalent to a 10% excise
tax, generated sustained debate around supporting evi-
dence [36]. This case study thematically analyses the ar-
guments put forth by industry groups to oppose the
evidence base prior to, and after implementation of, the
SSB levy. As well as fuller understanding of the discur-
sive strategies used to undermine public health research,
the findings offer lessons for developing effective counter
arguments to advance public health outcomes.
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Methods
We began by conducting a targeted search using the
media and business information database, Nexus Uni,
for responses in the media by the BSDA to research
related to the regulation of SSBs. The search phrase
used was: “British Soft Drinks Association” AND [re-
search OR study]. We limited our search to the
period from May 2014 to May 2020 to capture: (a)
the two-year period prior to announcement by the
UK government of the policy in March 2016; (b) the
interim period during which the government invited
industry comments (April 2016–March 2018); and (c)
the period since implementation on 6 April 2018.
The search yielded 1183 results. Finally, given our
interest in public-facing messaging, additional filters
were applied to limit results to newspapers, web-
based publications, newswires, magazines and jour-
nals, aggregated news sources and news. This resulted
in 1005 items. A second source of data for this ana-
lysis was media releases and position statements on
the BSDA’s website collected from 2016, the earliest
available on the BSDA website, to the present. This
search yielded 73 items for review.
The full text of all identified media reports, and BSDA
media releases and position statements, (n = 1078) were
screened for inclusion in this analysis. To be included,
the item needed to meet the following criteria: (a) topic
of the item specifically related to a research study linking
SSBs to an adverse health outcome; and [2] item con-
tains a direct quotation from the BSDA commenting on
research findings. In total, we identified 175 news arti-
cles and 7 media releases that contain a quote from the
BSDA commenting on 25 research studies. Articles were
excluded for not commenting on research related to the
safety of SSBs (n = 881); or not containing a direct quote
from the BSDA (n = 15). The included items were
reviewed a second time for confirmation. BSDA state-
ments directly related to SSB research were compiled in
a spreadsheet for thematic analysis. Additionally, the
name and abstract of the study commented upon was
also recorded.
For thematic analysis, the first and third authors
reviewed each statement from the BSDA and independ-
ently developed themes by asking: what type of argu-
ment is being used to oppose the research? What is the
basis of the argument put forth? How does the BSDA
support its own argument? After initial coding, the
authors agreed on four dominant BSDA response
themes: challenging scientific rigour and issues of
causation versus correlation; altruistic public health part-
ner portrayal; concepts of safety; and consumer respon-
sibility & lifestyle (see Table 1). The second author
audited 25% of statements to ensure consistency. Any
coding disagreements were resolved through discussion
among all authors.
Results
Challenging scientific rigour and issues of causation
versus correlation
This review found that the BSDA responded to the
majority of new research on SSBs by challenging their
study rigour and research design (n = 150). The critique
is most often made against observational studies, which
find an association between SSBs and an adverse health
outcome, arguing that association does not demonstrate
causation. For example, a systematic review and meta-
analysis by Imamura et al. found that “[h] abitual con-
sumption of sugar sweetened beverages was associated
with a greater incidence of type 2 diabetes, independ-
ently of adiposity,” amounting to around 1.8 million
cases in the US and 79,000 cases in the UK over a 10
year period [37]. The study, published in the British
Medical Journal in 2015 received widespread media
coverage in the UK, US, and other countries. BSDA
Director General Gavin Partington responded with the
following statement: “This is a health campaign state-
ment masquerading as an academic study as even the
authors accept no definitive conclusions can be drawn
about cause and effect”. Similarly, a large prospective
study published in the British Medical Journal in 2019
found “the consumption of sugary drinks was signifi-
cantly associated with the risk of overall cancer and
Table 1 Summary of Themes with Illustrative Quotes
Theme Frequency Illustrative Quote
Challenging scientific rigour and issues of
causation versus correlation
150 “‘This is a health campaign statement masquerading as an academic study as even the
authors accept no definitive conclusions can be drawn about cause and effect”
Altruistic public health partner 52 “We all have a role to play in helping to tackle obesity, and we hope our actions on sugar
reduction, portion size, and promotion of low and no-calorie products set an example for
the wider food sector.”
Concepts of safety 47 “The World Cancer Research Fund found no evidence that 100% fruit juice is carcinogenic
and maintain that a daily 150 ml glass ‘can be part of a healthy, balanced diet and a
healthy lifestyle’ and contribute to the 5-a-day fruit and vegetable target.”
Consumer responsibility & lifestyle 61 “Rather than singling out a particular product, we should be encouraging people to enjoy
an active lifestyle.”
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breast cancer” [38]. The BSDA commented in response:
“This study reports a possible association between
higher consumption of sugary drinks and an increased
risk of cancer, but does not provide evidence of cause, as
the authors readily admit”. The terminology that focuses
on the relationship between cause and effect, and the in-
ability of researchers to prove direct causation, is fea-
tured in the majority of BSDA statements identified.
Additional critiques of research design include refuting
the source of data, findings interpretation, or noting that
the study disagrees with previous industry-friendly stud-
ies. For example, in response to a 2015 study published
in the journal Circulation that found SSBs were respon-
sible for approximately 184,000 deaths in 2010, the
BSDA challenged the study by commenting: “The re-
searchers provide no evidence when they illogically and
wrongly take beverage intake calculations from around
the globe and allege that those beverages are the cause
of deaths which the authors themselves acknowledge are
due to chronic disease”.
A related argument used by the BSDA is to challenge
studies of the adverse health effects of SSBs by claiming
the neglect of confounding factors. Issued statements
note that health conditions, such as obesity or diabetes,
are complex and caused by numerous contextual factors,
which may play an equal or greater role than SSBs. For
example, the BSDA commented: “Experts agree world-
wide that diabetes is the result of many factors including
family history, lifestyle, and weight” in response to a
study linking SSBs to diabetes. In another statement, it
is claimed that “sugar is not the only thing to blame for
rising levels of obesity” and that “the evidence clearly
shows that heart disease and other obesity-related dis-
eases such as diabetes are caused by a multitude of
factors”.
Notably, the BSDA does not critique observational
studies, or those with clear methodological flaws,
where results favour its interests. Instead, these stud-
ies are quoted by industry. For example, a BSDA
press release documents the findings from an
industry-funded study by the British Fruit Juice Asso-
ciation with the headline: “Fruit juice drinkers have a
lower BMI and waist circumference that non-
consumers” [39]. The media release uses the findings
to justify the importance of fruit juice consumption
despite not being peer-reviewed or published, and its
use of secondary data. Moreover, while challenging
studies associated with adverse health outcomes for
failing to demonstrate causation, the BSDA did not
question the same methodology in this study. Based
on claims about the shortcomings of observational
studies suggesting adverse health outcomes, BSDA
spokespersons argue that such findings should not in-
fluence policy.
Industry as an altruistic public health partner
Another strategy used by the BSDA is to position the
organization as an altruistic public health partner
(n = 52). This is pursued in several ways. First, the
BSDA publicly acknowledges that health conditions
and diseases often associated with SSBs, such as obes-
ity, are significant public health concerns. It then po-
sitions the industry as committed to combatting such
concerns through industry-led voluntary efforts: “The
soft drinks industry recognises it has a role to play in
helping to tackle obesity which is why we have led
the way in calorie and sugar reduction”. Second, it
claims these voluntary industry efforts are the reason
for reduced SSB consumption across the UK. For in-
stance, in a 2016 statement on preventing diabetes,
the BSDA described how, “In contrast [to a proposal
for a SSB levy], the soft drinks industry is taking
practical steps to help consumers, through reformula-
tion, smaller portion sizes and increased promotion of
low- and no-calorie options - reducing sugar intake
by 7.5 percent recent years, and with plans to reduce
calories by a further 20 percent by 2020”. Statements
put forth with this claim do not acknowledge actions
taken by regulatory authorities, public health bodies,
academics, or grassroots organizations for this
purpose.
Promoting industry-friendly concepts of safety
The BSDA commonly referenced concepts of safety that
align with industry interests to counter research sup-
porting increased SSB regulation (n = 47). For example,
in a 2015 quote the BSDA director general claimed that
“[t] he latest review by the European Food Safety Au-
thority in 2015 confirms that energy drinks are safe and
make up a very small part of the caffeine intake of ado-
lescents and a negligible amount amongst children.”
Statements cite reputable health and scientific organiza-
tions, claiming that these bodies deem their products
wholly safe for consumption or when consumed in mod-
eration. For instance, in response to a 2019 study linking
SSBs to cancer, the BSDA stated: “The World Cancer
Research Fund found no evidence that 100% fruit juice
is carcinogenic and maintain that a daily 150ml glass
‘can be part of a healthy, balanced diet and a healthy life-
style’ and contribute to the 5-a-day fruit and vegetable
target”. The BSDA response to the study does not argue
that fruit juices are safe but rather that there is insuffi-
cient evidence to prove the relationship between fruit
juice consumption and cancer. In other words, the
BSDA moves from an absolute (‘it is not carcinogenic’)
to a conditional statement (“can be part of”) without
presenting the conditions that need to be present to
make drinking juice ‘healthy’. In this way, the BSDA se-
lectively applies statements from respected bodies,
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whose policy stance on SSBs are opposed to industry
positions, as a source of legitimacy for its claims. For
example, the World Cancer Research Fund, which the
BSDA cites for fruit juice safety, advocates for SSB taxes,
which the BSDA actively opposes [40].
Focus on unhealthy lifestyles of consumers
Another argument put forth by the BSDA is that un-
healthy lifestyles, rather than the consumption of SSBs,
should be the focus of public health concern. Healthy
lifestyles, in turn, are thus the responsibility of individual
consumers rather than industry (n = 61). The consump-
tion of SSBs, incorporated into a “balanced diet”, is de-
scribed as being a part of healthy lifestyles. For example,
the BSDA stated that “key risk factors for heart failure
include high blood pressure, which is a consequence of
an overall unhealthy diet and lack of exercise”. State-
ments focus on promoting interventions such as health
education campaigns, to inform the consumer of health
risks, or advocating for healthier lifestyles. For example,
the BSDA suggests that “rather than singling out a par-
ticular product, we should be encouraging people to
enjoy an active lifestyle”. It argues that the development
of adverse outcomes is therefore not inherent to a single
food or beverage but rather caused by the behaviours of
consumers.
Discussion
Given the fixation by the BSDA - and similar lobby-
ing organizations – regarding the purported lack of
evidence of causation between sugar and NCDs, it is
imperative that members of the public health commu-
nity try to educate policy makers about (a) the com-
plex nature of causation; (b) that evidence in favour
of public health interventions cannot, and do not,
solely rely on causation studies; and (c) that public
health must sometimes abide by the precautionary
principle in instituting interventions.
To begin, given the social, economic, and political de-
terminants of health, causation is never singular nor lin-
ear but rather always multifold and dynamic. Few, if any,
biological processes are such that there is only ever one
antecedent chemical or process that always causes the
same outcome; rather, it is usually the case that a num-
ber of antecedents need to be present – each of which
might be deemed necessary or sufficient – for a certain
outcome to occur. For example, to go from being in-
fected with virus x – which often depends on various en-
vironmental factors (e.g., ambient temperature, relative
humidity, etc.) - to having the disease associated with
virus x depends on numerous factors, including the viru-
lence of the particular strain of the virus and the im-
mune system of the host. The attendant complexity of
biology is then extrapolated when we then consider the
multitude of social, economic, and political factors that
affect the health of individuals and communities. Re-
garding SSBs, it is true that sugar alone does not cause
NCDs, but that sugar plays some important causal role
in many NCDs cannot be refuted. On this basis, it is
critical that the public health community should counter
the BSDA’s claims that sugar does not cause disease by
explicitly explaining the role of sugar as a key factor
within a complex adaptive system of human health and
illness.
Second, it is common practice in public health to insti-
tute policies and interventions on the basis of evidence
that is not derived from experimental study designs. The
hierarchy of evidence that is commonly used in the con-
text of evidence-based medicine (EBM), with the ran-
domized control trial (RCT) and systematic reviews at
its apex, does not translate to public health without sig-
nificant modifications [41, 42]. For example, research
questions in epidemiology overwhelmingly cannot be an-
swered using RCTs since study participants cannot and
often should not be assigned to pre-determined study
arms. As such, public health researchers commonly rely
on case-controls, cohorts, or cross-sectional designs.
Moreover, given the social dimensions of public health,
qualitative projects or surveys are used to derive evi-
dence necessary to answer questions that are relevant to
policy makers [43]. This excludes the criticisms that per-
sist against EBM, which critique its purported objectivity
and value-free perspectives [44–46]. As noted above,
public health must work to inform policy makers about
the various sorts of evidence that are used in the discip-
line that do not rely on establishing causation and ex-
perimental studies. In other words, the evidence base
around the negative effects of SSB on NCDs is sound
without needing to rely on RCTs or causation studies.
This fact, and industry claims to the contrary, need to be
clarified and reiterated in discussions with policy makers
and the broader public.
Finally, even if one were to dismiss arguments about
the inherent complexity of establishing causation and
the accumulation of evidence that does not rely on ex-
perimental studies, public health often invokes the pre-
cautionary principle in those instances when the
evidence towards a particular conclusion is unclear but
the potential negative effects are dire. Although various
articulations of the precautionary principle exist, gener-
ally speaking, it denotes that when there is uncertainty
with regard to a health-related activity or an activity that
impacts health, and one can foresee that the activity is
associated with significant harm, we ought to err on the
side of caution by protecting individuals and populations
from the activity until sufficient evidence as to its safety
can be ascertained [47, 48]. There are important epis-
temological and implementation challenges related to
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the precautionary principle [49]. Yet despite these chal-
lenges, the principle is invoked as a means of protecting
people from harm in moments of uncertainty. It has
been used in public health in a range of instances, from
the Rio Declaration on sustainability and the environ-
ment [50], to mandating the use of masks and physical
distancing in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic
despite no definitive proof of how it was transmitted in
the early stages of the outbreak. As such, although some
uncertainty may persist with regards to SSB and their
connection to NCDs, this uncertainty cannot be used
prima facie against regulation given the negative effects
of NCDs on persons and populations. The precautionary
principle, as often used in public health, suggests the op-
posite: that the onus of evidence lies with SSB industry
and lobbyists to provide satisfactory evidence as to its
safety.
It is within the above context that we can locate the
findings of this paper. In addition to attacking public
health research, the BSDA makes three other sustained
arguments in its public facing messaging: that it is an al-
truistic actor, that its products are safe, and that the
focus should be on individual responsibility. These argu-
ments are familiar, notably used by the tobacco industry,
among other corporate actors [51], for many decades to
counter accumulating and substantial public health re-
search on the health harms associated with their prod-
ucts. Tobacco companies have positioned themselves as
discouraging youth smoking [52, 53], fought evidence
that smoking and second hand smoke causes cancer
[54], are not disputing evidence regarding the harms of
vaping [55], and tried to focus public health debates on
individual choice [56]. The public health community, in
turn, has countered these efforts by monitoring and cri-
tiquing the industry’s corporate social responsibility
claims, taking tobacco companies to court for misrepre-
senting the harms of their products, and advancing un-
derstanding of the commercial, as opposed to
behavioral, determinants of health [57]. Perhaps, most
crucially, it has convened around an international legal
instrument – the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control – which has generated standards for evidence
and conflict of interests, and systems for monitoring in-
dustry activity and claims [58]. Efforts to country indus-
try influence in debates around SSB can learn from
these experiences and emulate these remedies.
At the same time, sugar is not the new tobacco as
sometimes argued by public health advocates. The rela-
tionship between SSB and poor health outcomes appears
more complex, and there are health benefits from the
consumption of some sugars in moderation, while con-
sumption of commercial tobacco products has inher-
ently negative effects on health. This means that, as
much as public health advocates can and should learn
from tobacco control, there is also need for additional
strategies. We argue that these could be derived from
the precautionary principle, as noted above, including
strategies that educate decision-makers and the public
about how to evaluate evidence based on public health,
not industry, standards which shifts the burden on in-
dustry to demonstrate the ‘safety’ of its products.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the BSDA consistently commented upon
SSB research through four arguments: challenging scien-
tific rigour, representing themselves as an altruistic pub-
lic health partner, promoting concepts of safety aligned
with their interests, and shifting focus onto consumer
responsibility and lifestyles. The findings demonstrate an
important role for public health to educate policymakers
and other stakeholders about the complexity of caus-
ation, the role of evidence in public health decision mak-
ing, and the importance of the precautionary principles.
This study reinforces the importance of monitoring cor-
porate actors from harm industries and rebutting mes-
sages against the interest of public health. Future
research is needed to understand, document, and re-
spond to emerging harm-related industries such vaping
undermining public health research in public domains.
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